# Verifyum security contact, per RFC 9116.
#
# Expires is a required field and this file is worse than absent once it has
# passed, so tools/check-code.php fails the build when fewer than 30 days
# remain. Renew by moving the date and nothing else.

Contact: mailto:post@aisense.no
Expires: 2027-09-06T00:00:00.000Z
Preferred-Languages: en, no
Canonical: https://verifyum.com/.well-known/security.txt

# What is worth reporting
#
# The service holds no user files and no accounts, so the interesting targets
# are the proof chain and the signing keys rather than stored data.
#
# A proof that verifies against the wrong bytes, a Merkle path that reaches a
# root it should not, a checkpoint whose document does not hash to its own
# stated hash, or a signature that verifies under a key that is not in
# https://verifyum.com/.well-known/verifyum-service-keys.json would each be a
# break of the central claim. So would any way to make the service sign
# metadata for a commitment that was never anchored.
#
# The verification path is specified at https://verifyum.com/spec/v1 and there
# is a standalone offline verifier, standard library only, at
# https://verifyum.com/clients/verifyum-verify-standalone.py
# Checking a proof needs no permission and no account.